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Pleading and Practice in Commercial
Paper Cases: Burdens of Proof
HAROLD R. WEINBERG*
INTRODUCTION
Money debts are frequently paid by checks and evidenced by
notes subject to Article Three of the Uniform Commercial Code.'
Financial institutions and other creditors ordinarily take these in-
struments with the expectation that they will be paid on time
without resort to litigation.2 This expectation fails when the debtor
or some other obligor on the instrument claims that its signature
was unauthorized or that there is a defense against payment.' This
Article analyzes the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) rules con-
cerning burdens of proof that apply to these disputes and gives con-
sideration to related procedural and evidentiary questions. It con-
cludes with some observations on the relationship between burdens
of proof in commercial paper cases and the policies underlying
commercial paper negotiability.4
BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING SIGNATURE AUTHENTICITY,
DEFENSES, AND HOLDER IN DUE COURsE STATUS
Code section 3-307 is the principal Article Three provision with
respect to burdens of proof. It provides:
*Professor, University of Kentucky College of Law. The author expresses his
appreciation to his colleagues, Robert Lawson and Richard Underwood, for their comments
on an earlier draft of this Article, and to David W. Regan, Class of 1985, University of
Kentucky College of Law, for his research assistance.
See UNri. COMMERcrIAL CODE §§ 3-301, 3-303, 3-104(l)-(2)(b),(d) (Official Text
1978)[hereinafter cited as U.C.C.]. Article Four of the Code, which deals with bank deposits
and collections, is also relevant to checks. See U.C.C. § 4-102(1).
2 The time for payment is controlled by the terms of the instrument and applicable
Code time limits. For example, a check is payable on demand, but the Code gives the drawee
bank a period of time in which to pay or dishonor. See U.C.C. §§ 3-104(2)(b), 4-213, 4-301,
4-302.
"No person is liable on an instrument unless their signature appears thereon."
U.C.C. § 3-401. "A signature may be made by an agent or other representative." U.C.C.
§ 3-403(l). An unauthorized signature may be the result of forgery or lack of authoriza-
tion. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201 (43), 3-404.
' Other Article Three provisions dealing with procedural and evidentiary matters are
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(1) Unless specifically denied in the pleadings each signature
on an instrument is admitted. When the effectiveness of a
signature is put in issue
(a) the burden of establishing it is on the party claiming under
the signature; but
(b) the signature is presumed to be genuine or authorized ex-
cept where the action is to enforce the obligation of a purported
signer who has died or become incompetent before proof is
required.
(2) When signatures are admitted or established, production
of the instrument entitles a holder to recover on it unless the
defendant establishes a defense.
(3) After it is shown that a defense exists a person claiming
the rights of a holder in due course has the burden of establishing
that he or some person under whom he claims is in all respects
a holder in due course.'
Section 3-307 must be read in light of the Code's definition of
"burden of establishing," which means "the burden of persuading
the triers of fact that the existence of the fact is more probable
than its non-existence." ' 6 Section 3-307 also takes meaning from
the definition of "presumption" or "presumed" which means "the
trier of fact must find the existence of the fact presumed unless
and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of
its non-existence."' For clarity of analysis, section 3-307 may be
broken down into four constituent rules.'
beyond the scope of this discussion. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-115 (incomplete instruments),
3-414(2) (indorser's contract), 3-419(2) (action against drawee).
U.C.C. § 3-307. See U.C.C. § 1-201(18), (39) (defining "genuine" and "signed").
The definitional cross references in the official comments to section 3-307 also refer to other
definitions including those quoted in the text at notes 6-7 infra. At least two jurisdictions
have enacted nonuniform versions of U.C.C. § 3-307. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 400.3-307 (1984
Cum. Supp.); Wis. STAT. § 403.307 (1964 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
6 U.C.C. § 1-201(8).
7 U.C.C. § 1-201(31).
' These Code rules may be supplemented or varied by local non-Code procedural
and evidentiary requirements. See U.C.C. § 3-307 & comment 1. See, e.g., Spurlock v. Com-
mercial Banking Co., 260 S.E.2d 912, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1342 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979).
In some instances courts have applied non-Code rules and overlooked the Code. See generally
Winship, Annual Survey of Texas Law-Commercial Transactions, 33 Sw. L.J. 203, 217-20
(1979).
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Rule One. Unless specifically denied in the pleadings, each
signature on an instrument is admitted.
A specific denial is required in order to give the plaintiff notice
that it must meet a claim of forgery or lack of authority., The
signature is admitted in the absence of a specific denial.'" A defend-
ant that fails to specifically deny the authenticity of a signature
is precluded from using lack of genuineness as a defense."
However, the defendant may be allowed to amend its answer pur-
suant to extra-Code pleading rules so as to raise the issue of
authenticity.' 2 Other authority indicates that pleading a special
defense that an agent lacked authority to sign on behalf of an
alleged principal is sufficient to prevent the signature from being
established by admission.3
Rule Two. If the effectiveness of a signature is placed in
issue, the party claiming thereunder has the burden of
establishing its authenticity. However, the signature is pre-
sumed to be authorized.
This rule reflects the Code draftsmen's belief that unauthorized
signatures are uncommon and that evidence concerning authenticity
is normally more available to the defendant than to the plaintiff
suing on the instrument.' 4 This assumption may be reasonable
(though certainly not always correct) when the signature in ques-
tion is that of a defendant against whom enforcement of the in-
strument is sought. The assumption may be less accurate when the
9 See U.C.C. § 3-307(1) & comment 1. One source of legal forms for use in com-
mercial paper litigation is 4A BENDER'S UtN'soR COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE (1983).
" U.C.C. § 3-307(1) & comment 1. See, e.g., Ferris v. Nichols, 245 So. 2d 660, 8
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
11 See Mechanics Nat'l Bank v. Shear, 386 N.E.2d 1299, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 438
(Mass. App. Ct. 1979). But see Calcasieu Marine Nat'l Bank v. Greene's Marine Prod.,
Inc., 386 So. 2d 926, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1319 (La. Ct. App. ), writ refused, 390 So.
2d 202 (La. 1980).
12 U.C.C. § 3-307 & comment 1. See also note 8 supra.
"I See General Prods. Co. v. Bezzini, 365 A.2d 843 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976).
" See U.C.C. § 3-307 & comment 1. The presumption does not operate when the
action is to enforce the instrument against a deceased or incompetent signer. See U.C.C.
§ 3-307(1)(b).
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signature in issue is an indorsement necessary to the plaintiff's
holder status, '1 but upon which no claim is made. Nonetheless,
the Rule Two presumption is broadly worded, and courts have
relied upon it in both of the above situations.' 6 After the presump-
tion of signature authenticity is rebutted by the defendant, section
3-307 allocates the burden of establishing the authenticity of the
signature to the plaintiff. I7 The issue of authenticity is ultimately
decided by the trier of fact upon all the evidence introduced."
As previously noted, "burden of establishing" and "presump-
tion" are defined by the Code.'9 These definitions have been the
subject of much scholarly comment and criticism."0 Regardless of
the criticism of these definitions, at least two points are reasonably
clear.
First, a party with the burden of establishing a fact clearly bears
the risk of nonpersuasion. That is, the trier of fact must find
against the party with the risk of nonpersuasion as to a particular
fact if all the evidence relevant to that fact is in equipoise.2' Thus,
a plaintiff who brings an action upon an instrument must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the signature in question
is authentic in order to be entitled to a verdict after the presump-
11 See note 41 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of what constitutes a
holder of a negotiable instrument.
" See, e.g., Watertown Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Sparks, 193 N.E.2d 333 (1963);
Freeman Check Cashing, Inc. v. New York, 412 N.Y.S.2d 963, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1186
(N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1979). But cf. Petty v. First Nat'l Bank, 363 N.E.2d 599, 21 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 1375 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976). Pre-Code cases typically placed the burden of establishing
the authenticity of both types of signatures on the plaintiff. See generally NV BRrrroN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES §§ 102, 129 (2d ed. 1961). However, some
courts may have given the plaintiff the benefit of a presumption of authenticity in the case
of questioned indorsements. See 2 NEw YoRx LAW REVISION COMMISSION, STUDY OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 973-74 (1955) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. U.C.C. STUDY].
17. U.C.C. § 3-307 comment 1.
" See Bates & Springer, Inc. v. Stallworth, 382 N.E.2d 1179, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
1181 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978).
9 See U.C.C. § 1-201(8), (31). See also text accompanying notes 6-7 supra.
20 See, e.g., Bigham, Presumptions, Burden of Proof and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 21 VAND. L. REv. 177 (1968); Kinyon, Actions on Commercial Paper: Holder's Pro-
cedural Advantages Under Article Three, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1441 (1967); Note, The Law
of Evidence in the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 GA. L. R. 'v. 44 (1966).
21 See generally F. JAMES, JR. & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.6 (2d ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as CIVIL PROCEDURE]; R. LAWSON, KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAW HANDBOOK
§ 9.00 (1976).
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tion of authenticity is rebutted.22
It is also clear that the word "presumed" allocates the initial
burden of going forward on the authenticity issue to the defendant
who must introduce some evidence of nonauthenticity or suffer a
directed verdict. 23 While the definition of presumed has been
criticized because it also may be interpreted to allocate the risk of
nonpersuasion in some contexts, only the former meaning can be
intended by Code section 3-307(1).4
In order to rebut the presumption of signature validity, the
alleged signer must introduce evidence sufficient to support a find-
ing of nonauthenticity.2 s The evidence need not be so overwhelm-
ing as to require a directed verdict in the defendant's favor, but
it must be sufficient to permit a finding in its favor.26 One court
has stated that the presumption will be rebutted when some
evidence is introduced to support each element of the claim of
nonauthenticity without regard to whether the evidence possesses
any particular weight.27 The cases disagree as to whether a sworn
denial without any additional evidence of nonauthenticity is suf-
ficient to rebut the presumption.2"
The forms of evidence relevant to the question of signature
authenticity can be a function of the type of signature in issue. For
example, suppose an action is brought on a corporate instrument
against an alleged individual obligor who claims that her signature
was forged. Evidence indicating that the defendant's interest in the
22 See Metropolitan Mortgage Fund, Inc. v. Basiliko, 407 A.2d 773 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1979), aff'd, 415 A.2d 582 (Md. 1980).
23 See generally CIVM PROCEDURE, supra note 21, at § 7.7; R. LAWSON, supra note
21, at § 10.00.
2, Professor Bigham criticized the definition, but assumed that "presumed" is used
in section 3-307(1)(b) to allocate the burden of going forward. See Bigham, supra note 20,
at 192. Other commentators agree with this interpretation of section 3-307 but apparently
not with the criticism of the definition. See Kinyon, supra note 20, at 1449-50; Note, supra
note 20, at 46-49, 52-53.
11 See U.C.C. § 1-201(8).
26 See U.C.C. § 3-307 comment 1.
27 See Freeman Check Cashing, Inc. v. New York, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 963.
2, See Bates & Springer, Inc. v. Stallworth, 382 N.E.2d at 1179 (sworn denial insuf-
ficient); McCusker v. Fascione, 368 A.2d 1220 (R.I. 1977) (sworn denial sufficient, but there
was other evidence of nonauthenticity). See also Burkett v. Finger Lake Dev. Corp., 336
N.E.2d 628 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); Metropolitan Mortgage Fund, Inc. v. Basiliko, 407 A.2d
at 773.
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corporation benefitted by her signing (for example, her signature
may have induced a loan to the corporation) can have weight in
establishing that the signature is genuine. Eyewitness testimony by
the plaintiff, or by some other person present at the making of the
signature by the defendant, can also be of probative value.29 The
lack of these types of evidence may give rise to an inference that
the signature is not authentic.
Each side may wish to employ a qualified questioned document
and handwriting identification expert to give an opinion as to
authenticity." Of course, even a marked dissimilarity between a
defendant's true signature and the signature on an instrument does
not conclusively demonstrate that the latter was unauthorized, for
the defendant may have authorized another person to sign on its
behalf.3
Claims against corporate entities constitute another important
class of litigation in which signature validity can be in issue.
Evidence relative to an agent's power to bind a corporate principal
might be found in corporate resolutions or other documents con-
taining express grants of authority,32 or in conduct or language on
the part of the alleged principal amounting to a grant of apparent
authority.33
Although the issue of signature authenticity is distinct from
questions relating to the type of commercial paper contract made
by the alleged signer, the same evidence might be relevant to both
issues. For example, a woman might allege that her signature on
a note was forged by her former husband and, in the alternative,
that she signed as an accommodation party. Accommodation
liability might permit her to invoke suretyship defenses not available
to a co-maker.34 Proof that the loan evidenced by the note was
29 See, e.g., Metropolitan Mortgage Fund, Inc. v. Basiliko, 407 A.2d at 778.
0 One source for locating specialists is 1 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAw DIRECTORY at
IX-X (1984). Sample questions to be employed in the qualification of an expert document
examiner may be found in IMWINKELRIED, EViDENTIARY FotNDAllONs 60-62 (1980).
' See, e.g., McCusker v. Fascione, 368 A.2d at 1220.
32 B&C Enters. v. Utter, 498 P.2d 1327 (Nev. 1972).
3 See, e.g., General Prods. Co. v. Bezzini, 365 A.2d at 843. The power to sign for
another may be established under agency principles which, for the most part, are found
in extra-Code law. See U.C.C. §§ 1-103, 3-403(l), 4-405. See generally RESTATEmENr
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 7-8, 8A-8B, 26-27 (1958).
34 See U.C.C. §§ 3-415, 3-416, 3-606.
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utilized to purchase a house in which the defendant resided with
her former spouse could help to establish both that the signature
is authentic and that co-maker's liability was intended. 5 Similar-
ly, evidence concerning a corporate agent's authority might help
to establish both that the agent was authorized to bind the cor-
poration on a negotiable instrument and that the agent's signature
created a contract that was intended to bind the corporation and
not the agent.
3 6
Rule Three. When signatures are admitted or established,
production of the instrument entitles a holder to recover
thereon unless the defendant establishes a defense.
A holder is a person who has possession of a negotiable in-
strument and who is entitled to payment on the instrument. 7 Rule
Three protects the defendant because the plaintiff's production of
the instrument insures that it has not been negotiated to some other
person. This protection is necessary because, had the instrument
been negotiated to some other person, the unknown person could
be a holder in due course entitled to enforce the instrument against
the defendant despite the defendant's prior satisfaction of the plain-
tiff's claim.38
Rule Three creates a rebuttable presumption that the holder
is entitled to recover on the instrument.3 9 It allocates the burden
of going forward with evidence of defenses to the defendant. The
right to recover is presumed because the claimant is a holder. Of
course, the claimant must establish that it is a holder prior to
obtaining the benefit of the presumption. 0
35 See Riegler v. Riegler, 426 S.W.2d 789, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 150 (Ark. 1968).
' See U.C.C. § 3-403(2). See generally Holland, Corporate Officer Beware- Your
Signature on a Negotiable Instrument May Be Hazardous to Your Economic Health, 13
IND. L. REv. 893 (1980).
37 See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(20), 3-102(1)(a), 3-202(1), 3-301, and note 41 infra. A transferee
who is not a holder is not aided by the presumption that he is entitled to recover. See U.C.C.
§ 3-201(3). The Code provides special procedures for recovery by owners of lost, destroyed
or stolen instruments. See U.C.C. § 3-804.
" Payment of the instrument would discharge the defendant. U.C.C. § 3-603.
However, discharge is a defense that is not good against a holder in due course. U.C.C.
§§ 3-305, 3-602.
" See U.C.C. § 3-201(3) & comment 8.
See, e.g., Lloyd v. Lawrence, 472 F.2d 313, 316, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1205 (5th
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
To obtain holder status a person must be in possession of an
instrument which meets the Article Three form requirements for
a negotiable instrument.4 ' In addition, the claimant's possession
must be the result of a transfer which satisfies the Article's re-
quirements for a negotiation. 2 These requirements often demand
one or more authentic indorsements. For example, a payee in
possession of a check drawn to his order must indorse the check
in order to negotiate it."3 Rule Three requires a would-be holder
of the check to establish the authenticity of the payee's
indorsement. 4 However, the Rule Two presumption of signature
authenticity assists the claimant and may obviate the need for any
evidence on this issue.45
In many instances there will be little reason to doubt the plain-
tiff's claim to holder status. However, the defendant may wish to
raise this issue and require production of the instrument in order
to be certain of the instrument's whereabouts and its availability
for cancellation and surrender in the event the plaintiff obtains a
Cir. 1973); Blair v. Halliburton Co., 456 S.W.2d 414, 415, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 67 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1970). The rights of a holder are set out in U.C.C. § 3-301.
" See P P Inc. v. McGuire, 509 F. Supp. 1079, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 606 (D.N.J.
1981). Holder is defined as "a person who is in possession of a document of title or an
instrument.., drawn, issued, or indorsed to him or his order or to bearer or in blank."
U.C.C. § 1-201(20).
The form requirements for a negotiable instrument are contained in U.C.C. §§ 3-104
to -112. Article Three also applies to some nonnegotiable instruments. See U.C.C. § 3-805.
' See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(20), 3-202(1). See generally B. CLARK, Tm LAw OF BANK
DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS 1.2(2) (Rev. ed. 1981).
" But see U.C.C. § 4-205(1) (refers to a missing indorsement supplied by a depositary
bank).
" A person who is not entitled to claim holder status in his own right because of
a missing indorsement may attempt to obtain this status under the Article Three "shelter
provision," which provides the transferee of an instrument with all the protecton of his
transferor's title. See U.C.C. § 3-201(1). However, it is questionable whether this provi-
sion was intended to operate in this manner. See generally McDonnell, Freedom from Claims
and Defenses: A Study of Judicial Activism Under the UCC, 17 GA. L. REv. 509, 586-90
(1983); B. CLaRK supra note 42, at 4.3.
A non-holder transferee may be entitled to enforce the instrument as a contractual
assignee of the transferor's rights to payment. However, the transferee would not be en-
titled to the rights of a holder. See U.C.C. § 3-201(3). See generally BRADY ON BANK CHEcKs
§ 7.09 (1979).
" See, e.g., Lawson v. Finance Am. Private Brands, 537 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App.
1976).
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judgment and the instrument must be paid.46 A general denial may
be sufficient for this purpose.4 7 If the plaintiff is, in fact, a holder,
the right to the Rule Three presumption can readily be established.
For example, holder status might be established through actual in-
troduction of a note into evidence or by submission of a sworn
copy of the note and an affidavit attesting to the fact of
possession.48
Once the Rule Three presumption becomes operative, the
holder is entitled to recover unless the defendant produces evidence
that "establishes a defense." According to the Code's official com-
ments, this language is intended to place upon the defendant the
burden of establishing defenses "not only in the first instance but
by a preponderance of the total evidence." 4 Thus, Rule Three
places the risk of nonpersuasion on the defendant with the result
that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict in its.favor if, after con-
sidering all relevant evidence, the trier of fact is unable to decide
whether a defense has been established. The issue of plaintiff's
status as a holder in due course does not even arise if the defend-
ant is unable to establish a defense. 0
Rule Three applies in cases where an officer signs his name to
a corporate instrument in such a way that personal liability is ap-
parently created. Assuming that the Code permits the officer to
46 See U.C.C. § 3-605. If the instrument is not surrendered, a holder in due course
may later require another payment. See U.C.C. §§ 3-305, 3-602.
"7 See, e.g., Riley v. First State Bank, 469 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Blair
v. Halliburton Co., 456 S.W.2d at 414. See also Lloyd v. Lawrence, 472 F.2d at 313.
" U.C.C. § 3-307(2) has been interpreted to require production of the original in-
strument. See Ferris v. Nichols, 245 So. 2d at 660; Riley v. First State Bank, 469 S.W.2d
at 812. However, this section does not expressly preclude judgment if the plaintiff provides
sworn assurances that the instrument is within its control. See Chaviers v. Simmons, 510
S.W.2d 301 (Ark. 1974); McKirgan v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 375 A.2d 591, 22
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 101 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977).
' See U.C.C. § 3-307 comment 2. See also U.C.C. § 3-305 comment 3; U.C.C. §
3-306 comment 4. "Established" and "establishes" as used in U.C.C. § 3-307(2) apparently
refer to "burden of establishing" as defined by U.C.C. § 1-201(8). See note 6 supra; Kin-
yon, supra note 20, at 1452.
,0 Nutmeg Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Cowden, 524 F. Supp. 620, 621, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
484 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). But see Oklahoma Nat'l Bank v. Equitable Credit Fin. Co., 489 P.2d
1331 (Okla. 1971). For a brief discussion of this case, see text accompanying notes 71-72
infra.
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introduce parol evidence to show that the signature was intended
to bind only the corporation,II the officer must affirmatively plead
and establish this defense in order to escape liability to a holder."
It should be noted that Rule Three leaves many pleading and
proof matters to extra-Code law." The usual procedural require-
ment that a complaint state a claim for relief requires pleadings
describing the terms of the instrument and the amount owing
thereunder." Special characteristics of the commercial paper con-
tract being sued upon may also have to be specified in the com-
plaint. For example, a complaint by the payee of a check against
the drawer should plead the occurrence of the conditions prece-
dent to drawer liability such as dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank." The burden of establishing dishonor presumably follows
the burden of pleading."
Rule Four. After the defendant shows that a defense exists,
the claimant has the burden of establishing the rights of a
holder in due course.
A holder is entitled to recover on an instrument so long as there
is no valid defense thereon. If a defense that may be cut off by
a holder in due course has been shown to exist, the claimant may
seek to cut it off by virtue of this status." The claimant has the
" The Code does not permit agents to raise this type of defense in some cases. See
U.C.C. § 3-403(2); note 36 supra.
12 See, e.g., Norfolk County Trust Co. v. Vichinsky, 359 N.E.2d 59, 20 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 1226 (Mass. App. Ct. 1977); Seale v. Nichols, 505 S.W.2d 251, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
457 (Tex. 1974).
" See U.C.C. § 1-103; note 8 supra.
'" See FED. R. Civ. P. 8 & form 3 [hereinafter cited as FRCP]; KY. R. Civ. P. 8.01
& form 2.
1 Regard should always be given to these "statutory contracts" in drafting a com-
plaint. See U.C.C. §§ 3-122 (accrual of cause of action), 3-413 (contracts of maker, drawer,
or acceptor), 3-414 (contract of indorser), 3-415 (contract of accommodation party), 3-416
(contract of guarantor).
' See generally Kinyon, supra note 20, at 1454-55.
" "Personal defenses" such as breach of warranty and failure of consideration may
be cut off by holders in due course. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-305(1)-(2), 3-408, 3-407(2), 3-306.
However, holders in due course are subject to a few "real defenses" such as certain types
of incapacity or illegality. See U.C.C. § 3-305(2)(a)-(d). If evidence of a real defense is in-
troduced by the defendant, a holder in due course may introduce rebuttal evidence. See
U.C.C. § 3-307(2).
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burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that it
is a holder in due course. 5 This burden can be met by establishing
that the plaintiff is a holder in due course in its own right. This
requires affirmative proof that the instrument was taken for value,
in good faith, and without notice of any defense. 59 The plaintiff's
own clear, direct and uncontradicted testimony may be sufficient
to establish these facts. 60 The plaintiff might also meet this burden
by establishing that it obtained the rights of a holder in due course
from its transferor who was a holder in due course.
61
Rule Four employs different statutory terminology than Rule
Three. A defendant will lose under Rule Three unless it "establishes
a defense." ' 6 Rule Four states that the plaintiff has the burden of
establishing holder in due course status after it is "shown that a
defense exists. ' 63 This shift in language creates an issue concern-
ing the intended meaning of Rule Four.
The draftsmen may have used "shown" in Rule Four to
describe the situation in which a defense has been "established"
pursuant to Rule Three. Only after the existence of a defense has
been shown to be more probable than not or stipulated would a
holder need to prove due course status. This interpretation leaves
the Rule Three burden of persuasion of establishing a defense on
the defendant within the context of Rule Four.
On the other hand, this difference in language might have been
intended to indicate that evidence insufficient to establish a defense
under Rule Three may nonetheless be sufficient to show a defense
S, U.C.C. § 3-307 comment 3. See United Bank Ltd. v. Cambridge Sporting Goods
Corp., 360 N.E.2d 943, 950, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 980 (N.Y. 1976).
59 See U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 3-303, 3-304. The plaintiff may also be required to prove
that it is a holder. See Bank v. Blackwelder Furniture Co., 181 S.E.2d 785, 9 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 608 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971). For the definition of "holder" see U.C.C. §§ 1-201(20),
3-202(1).
60 See, e.g., Favors v. Yaffe, 605 S.W.2d 342, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 154 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1980). Of course, the defendant may offer counter testimony. See, e.g., Funding Con-
sultants, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 447 A.2d 1163, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 591
(Conn. 1982).
"2 U.C.C. § 3-307(3). This result also follows under the Article Three "shelter pro-
vision." See U.C.C. § 3-201(1). See also Blake v. Samuelson, 524 P.2d 624, 15 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 131 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974); B. CIARK, supra note 42, at § 4.3; McDonnell, supra
note 44, at 586-90.
62 U.C.C. § 3-307(2) (emphasis added).
63 U.C.C. § 3-307(3) (emphasis added).
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under Rule Four, thus requiring the plaintiff to establish that it
is a holder in due course. A defense might be shown if the evidence
is sufficient to avoid a directed verdict against the defendant but
insufficient to support a verdict in the defendant's favor.
The former interpretation must be correct." It is supported by
the official comments to section 3-307(3) which indicate that a
plaintiff-holder may obtain a favorable verdict in the face of
evidence of a defense even if it does not offer rebuttal evidence
or attempt to establish holding in due course.65 These comments
suggest that the section's intent is to give the plaintiff the choice
of (1) rebutting the defendant's case; (2) cutting off the defense by
establishing holder in due course status; or (3) testing the sufficiency
of the defendant's evidence by moving for a directed verdict or by
allowing the evidence to go to the trier of fact.6 6 Rule Four's
drafting history also supports the former interpretation. This rule
was not intended to change pre-Code law requiring a defendant
to prove a defense by a preponderance of the evidence before the
plaintiff had to prove holding in due course.67
" The former interpretation enjoys commentator support. See generally R. ALDER-
MAN, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3.34 (2d ed. 1983);
Kinyon, supra note 20, at 1456, 1462-63; Note, supra note 20, at 53-54. But see BRADY
ON BANK CHaCKs, supra note 44, at § 9.9 ("Under the Code, proof of a defense is not
necessary; it is only necessary that a defense be asserted to impose the burden upon the
holder to establish due course status." However, the difference between showing and
establishing a defense may be "slight.").
65 See U.C.C. § 3-307 comment 3.
66 See id.
67 See UNx. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW § 59 (1896) ("Every holder is deemed
prima facie to be a holder in due course; but when it is shown that the title of any person
who has negotiated the instrument was defective, the burden is on the holder to prove
[holding in due course] . . . .") [hereinafter cited as N.I.L.] (emphasis added).
The best view was that a title was "defective" when there was a personal defense
that would not be good against a holder in due course. See generally W. BRrrroN, supra
note 16, at § 104. There was substantial agreement that a defective title was "shown" and
the presumption of holding in due course rebutted only after the defense was proved by
a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at § 103.
Pre-1956 official drafts of U.C.C. § 3-307 eliminated the presumption of holding in
due course and provided that "faifter evidence of a defense has been introduced a person
claiming the rights of a holder in due course has the burden of establishing that he or some
person under whom he claims is in all respects a holder in due course." U.C.C. § 3-307
(Proposed Official Draft 1952) (emphasis added). The New York Law Revision Commis-
sion recognized that the italicized draft language placed a less substantial evidentiary burden
on the defendant than was provided in N.I.L. § 59. See N.Y. U.C.C. STUDY, supra note
16, at 975-76; 1 NEw YORK LAW REVISION COMISSION, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM CoMER-
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Moreover, the latter interpretation lacks a logical and per-
suasive rationale and fails to provide guidance in the event the
defendant shows but does not establish a defense, perhaps by
evidence of suspect credibility, and the plaintiff-holder is unable
to establish due course. These circumstances should not entitle the
defendant to a directed verdict if reasonable minds might differ
upon whether the defendant has a defense."8 Rule Three requires
that a defense be established in order to prevent recovery by a
holder; Rule Four does not alter this recovery right. Thus, the
defendant must still establish a defense, and the plaintiff is still
entitled to have the trier of fact consider the defensive evidence.
But then, why is the plaintiff required to put on evidence of holding
in due course if it has any to offer? One might postulate that it
takes fewer judicial and private resources to decide whether the
plaintiff is a holder in due course than to decide whether there is
a defense and that the lower cost and potentially dispositive inquiry
should be completed before the more expensive inquiry is under-
taken. However, this assumption of relative costs is not universally
(and perhaps not even generally) correct. Moreover, a plaintiff
needs no statutory encouragement to plead and prove holding in
due course if this status appears to be the more efficient means
to a judgment. 69 Of course, Rule Four does not prevent a plain-
tiff from pleading in its complaint and proving as part of its case
in chief that it is a holder in due course.
70
CIAL CODE 268-69, 544-45 (1954). The 1956 recommendations of the editorial board for
the Uniform Commercial Code replaced the italicized draft wording with the current "[a]fter
it is shown that a defense exists" for the following reason: "The addition was inserted,
in accord with a suggestion of the American Bankers Association Committee, to restore
the expression 'it is shown that,' which occurs at N.I.L. § 59, in order to make clear that
no change in the quantum of evidence is here intended." A.L.I. & NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR
rHE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 107 (1956).
6 But see Bigham, supra note 20, at 194.
6' It seems likely that the least costly means to a resolution in private resources also
would be the least costly in public resources such as those spent on maintenance of the
judicial system. The value of the public resources allocable to a particular case are prob-
ably modest in comparison with the costs born directly by the litigants. See generally R.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 401-02 (2d ed. 1977).
70 See, e.g., Jaeger & Branch, Inc. v. Pappas, 433 P.2d 605, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
950 (Utah 1967). This tactic may minimize the impact of the defendant's evidence. See
generally Kinyon, supra note 20, at 1463-64. It also may preclude the need to decide whether
there is a defense. See note 85 infra and accompanying text.
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Rule Four has been considered in numerous reported cases.
There are indications that a fairly minimal evidentiary showing may
be sufficient in some courts to trigger the plaintiff's burden of
establishing holding in due course. One appellate case indicates that
the defendant's evidence need show only the "possibility of a
defense.'"' That this court meant what it said is suggested by its
holding that the record supported the trial court's conclusion that
the plaintiff-holder failed to establish due course status pursuant
to Rule Four, but that a new trial was necessary because the drawer
had not sustained its Rule Three burden of establishing a defense.7"
Frequently it is difficult to assess the precise manner in which
Rule Four is being applied. Some opinions lack detailed considera-
tion of the defensive evidence in the record, perhaps because
defendants sometimes prove a defense with relative ease and a close
inquiry into the quantum of evidence necessary to show a defense
is not needed.73 In other cases this inquiry may be unnecessary
because the evidence supports findings both of a defense and of
the plaintiff's notice of the defense or bad faith. 7 For example,
the facts might establish both that the corporate payee of a note
failed to perform the transaction for which the note was issued by
the maker and that the corporate officer holding the note was in-
timately involved in the transaction.7 5 A third reason that it can
be difficult to gauge judicial applications of Rule Four may lie in
an unstated preference to dispose of cases on the plaintiff's holder
in due course standing when it is questionable whether a defense
has been shown.
76
7, Oklahoma National Bank v. Equitable Credit Finance Co., 489 P.2d at 1334.
72 See id. at 1334-35.
13 Cf. Pugatch v. David's Jewelers, 278 N.Y.S.2d 759, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 202 (N.Y.
Cir. Ct. 1967); Favors v. Yaffe, 605 S.W.2d at 342.
14 See, e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Shuster, 307 N.W.2d 767, 32 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 585 (Minn. 1981).
" See Frequency Elecs., Inc. v. National Radio Co., 422 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aff'd, 546 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
76 Cf. Chemical Bank v. Haskell, 411 N.E.2d 1339 (N.Y. 1980), in which the New
York Court of Appeals stated that defenses were alleged, assumed their validity, and then
held that the plaintiff was a holder in due course. The lower court had previously held that
the defenses had been established and that the plaintiff was not a holder in due course.
See Chemical Bank v. Haskell, 417 N.Y.S.2d 541 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 411 N.E.2d
at 1339.
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In one case that may exemplify this tendency, the defendant-
drawer stopped payment on a check which was thereafter returned
to the depositary bank." The bank had advanced the amount of
the check to its customer, the payee. The drawer alleged that he
stopped payment because he did not owe the full amount of the
check; he testified that "the whole thing is a mess, it can't be deter-
mined who owes who" or how much. 78 At the time of the trial an
accounting between the drawer and the payee had been undertaken,
but was incomplete."
The court unequivocally held that the defendant failed to meet
its burden of establishing a defense and that the bank was entitled
to recover qua holder pursuant to Rule Three. Nonetheless, the
court went on to consider the plaintiff's due course standing, in-
dicating that if the defendant had established a good defense, then
the burden would shift to the plaintiff pursuant to Rule Four. The
court stated that this determination had utility in ascertaining the
size of the judgment due the plaintiff who had recovered some of
the amount given for the check through a charge-back against the
customer-payee's account. 0 The court believed that this assistance
would come through a technical analysis of whether the bank had
given "value" as specially defined by the Code for purposes of
bank due course standing." However, assuming that a determina-
tion of value was useful to prevent double recovery, 2 there was
no good reason to also decide whether the bank had taken the
check in good faith or lacked notice of defenses, unless the court
wanted to be certain of the bank's right to recover in the face of
the drawer's claimed defense. 3
American Exch. Bank v. Cessna, 386 F. Supp. 494 (N.D. Okla. 1974).
78 Id. at 496.
79 Id.
1o See id. at 497.
' See id. See also U.C.C. §§ 4-208, 4-209.
" It is doubtful that a pro tanto discharge of the drawer resulted from the "satisfac-
tion" of the check by the depositary bank's charge-back against the customer's account.Cf.
U.C.C. §§ 3-601(3), 3-603; note 83 infra.
1 Mere holder status is sufficient to enable a depositary bank to enforce the entire
amount of an unpaid check against the drawer. See generally B. CLARK, supra note 42,
at 4.212][d]. The double payment problem arises when the bank charges back against the
customer-payee's account with the result that it does not need the entire amount of the
check to be made whole. The drawer then owes (absent a good defense) part of the check
to the bank and part to the payee-customer. The Code's "value" provisions may be helpful
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Often courts are not asked to decide a case directly on the
operation of Rule Four. Instead, they must weigh proof of defenses
and holder in due course status in the context of summary judg-
ment procedure. In such cases, the immediate issues are whether
the moving party has shown the absence of any genuine issue as
to any material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.84 One commentator has stated that
summary judgment procedure is particularly well suited to actions
on instruments because holder in due course status, if established,
precludes the need to consider whether there is a genuine factual
issue as to the existence of defenses." A plaintiff might seek to
establish that it is a holder in .due course through the use of af-
fidavits, depositions, admissions or other evidentiary materials in
support of its motion. The defendant may be unable to successfully
controvert these facts if the plaintiff's claim to due course status
is legitimate and adequately supported.86
While the road to summary recovery is inviting, in practice
plaintiffs sometimes fail to clearly establish due course status
through the use of summary forms of proof." In one of these cases
the payee of three checks totaling $160,000, who had told the
drawer that the checks would not be negotiated, deposited them
in measuring the amount due the bank and, hence, the payee. See U.C.C. §§ 4-208, 4-209.
The drawer may be protected against multiple suits by the law of assignments, at least when
it is sued by a holder-depositary bank that lacks due course standing. See U.C.C. § 3-306.
Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 326, 339. The drawer's contract will be
discharged to the extent of its payment to the bank-holder. U.C.C. § 3-603. It is not likely
that the payee, if it subsequently sued the drawer on the check, could avoid this discharge.
See U.C.C. §§ 3-201(1), 3-305(2); note 38 supra.
" See FRCP 56(c). It is generally agreed that this burden is on the moving party.
See generally Crvu. PROCEDURE, supra note 21, at § 6.18.
11 6 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.17[8]
(2d ed. 1982).
6 See, e.g., St. Cloud Nat'l Bank &Trust Co. v. Sobania Constr. Co., 224 N.W.2d
746, 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 679 (Minn. 1974); Washington Trust Co. v. Fatone, 244 A.2d
848 (R.I. 1968).
8" See, e.g., Northside Bank v. Investors Acceptance Corp., 278 F. Supp. 191, 5
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 169 (W.D. Pa. 1968). Cf. Peoples Bank v. Haar, 421 P.2d 817, 3 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 1065 (Okla. 1966). In general, courts will not grant a motion for summary judg-
ment if there is any chance that the facts at trial will look different from the summary proof
tendered in support of and in opposition to the motion. See generally CIvIL PROCEDURE,
supra note 21, at § 6.18. In the specific context of commercial paper litigation, this judicial
reluctance may be reinforced by the loss of valid defenses against payment of an instru-
ment that is a consequence of negotiability. See text accompanying notes 97-106 infra.
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in her overdrawn account and was subsequently permitted by the
depositary bank to make withdrawals of over $157,000 even though
the checks had not cleared. 8 The checks proved to be drawn
against insufficient funds, and the depositary bank sued the drawer
for the amount withdrawn plus interest, claiming that it was a
holder in due course. In defense the drawer pleaded that the payee
had committed fraud.8 9
In the trial court the plaintiff bank supported its motion for
summary judgment with the affidavit of the vice-president in charge
of the branch where the payee's account was located. This docu-
ment recounted the deposit, immediate clearance, and crediting of
the three items and stated upon personal knowledge as well as in-
formation and belief that the bank had neither notice nor
knowledge of any defense and that the bank had acted in good
faith. The trial court granted summary judgment.90
On appeal this affidavit was held inadequate to establish the
plaintiff's right to recover. Its general statements were framed in
terms of conclusions of law, and it did not contain the testimony
of the bank employees who actually dealt with the payee-customer.
Their knowledge and state of mind, and not that of the branch
vice-president, was seen by the court as requisite to establishing
the bank's due course standing. 9' The court noted that, standing
alone, neither the bank's indulgence of its customer (who had been
chronically overdrawn), nor its allowance of the withdrawals prior
to clearance of the items and without verification of the drawer's
balance was sufficient to establish bad faith. However, it indicated
that the bank's "foolish" and "precipitate" actions in attempting
to shift the loss to the drawer raised an inference that could be
characterized as the "antithesis of good faith." 9
It should be noted that the depositary bank probably did
11 See Seinfeld v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 405 So. 2d 1039, 32 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 1137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
"1 Id. at 1041.
90 Id..
" See id. at 1042.
92 See id. See also Northside Bank v. Investors Acceptance Corp., 278 F. Supp. at
191; Oklahoma Nat'l Bank v. Equitable Credit Fin. Co., 489 P.2d at 1331. But see Citizens
Nat'l Bank v. Fort Lee Say. & Loan Ass'n, 213 A.2d 315 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1965);
Bowling Green, Inc. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 425 F.2d 81 (Ist Cir. 1970); St. Cloud
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Sobania Constr. Co., 224 N.W.2d at 746.
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manage to establish that it was a holder. As such, it would be en-
titled to recover pursuant to Rule Three unless the defendant
established a defense.93 Apparently the bank did not pursue this
avenue, and the court was not required to consider the drawer's
affidavit which stated that he issued the checks in reliance upon
the payee's misrepresentation that they would not be negotiated.,"
However, other cases suggest that an affidavit reciting an alleged
defense on personal knowledge and belief and setting forth facts
that are admissible into evidence will be sufficient to demonstrate
a genuine issue of material fact, thus preventing the entry of sum-
mary judgment against the defendant." Perhaps even more
minimal summary proof would be sufficient to avoid a summary
judgment.
9 6
CONCLUSION: BURDENS OF PROOF AND NEGOTIABILITY
There is an oft-described relationship between the legal prin-
ciples governing burdens of proof in commercial paper litigation
and the policies that underlie commercial paper negotiability. For
example, negotiability doctrine contractually obligates persons who
make commercial paper contracts to holders even when there is an
absence of direct privity.97 This attribute can provide holders with
multiple obligors, thereby making commercial paper easier to en-
force and facilitating its transfer.98 The Rule Two presumption of
signature authenticity clearly seems intended to serve the same ends.
Similarly, the holder in due course's right to cut off defenses
enhances the collectibility and, hence, marketability of commer-
cial paper, as does the Code's allocation of the burdens of proving
defenses and due course status in Rules Three and Four.19
" See text accompanying notes 37-56 supra.
" See 405 So. 2d at 1041.
91 See Northside Bank v. Investors Acceptance Corp., 278 F. Supp. at 191; Pitillo
v. Demetry, 145 S.E.2d 792, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 58 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965).
96 However, the defendant will lose if it makes no attempt to show a defense or offers
only hearsay evidence. See Loew v. Minasian, 280 N.E.2d 688, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 676
(Mass. 1972); Anderson v. Industrial State Bank, 478 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
" See U.C.C. §§ 3-413 to -416. This result was once very controversial. See generally
Freyer, Antebellum Commercial Law: Common Law Approaches to Secured Transactions,
70 Ky. L.J. 593, 594-95 (1981-82).
" See generally Weinberg, Commercial Paper in Economic Theory and Legal History,
70 Ky. L.J. 567, 571-72 (1981-82).
99 See id. at 572-73, 579; Kinyon, supra note 20, at 1457-64.
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This relationship between negotiability and burdens of proof
may sometimes be employed to strengthen the position of commer-
cial paper claimants. Counsel might successfully argue, for
example, that the policy favoring the free flow of commercial paper
militates against an unduly burdensome application of Rule Four's
requirement that the claimant-holder establish due course status.' 0
Of course, such an approach is unavailable when the action is on
a consumer note against which defenses may be asserted as a result
of consumer protection legislation or regulations.'"' However, it
still may be employed in actions on nonconsumer notes and on
checks and other types of negotiable instruments.
The relationship between negotiability and burdens of proof
also creates a risk for commercial paper claimants. The same
dissatisfaction with negotiability that led to the demise of the right
to cut off defenses on consumer notes is still very much alive.
Perhaps its starkest manifestation is in proposed modifications to
Articles Three and Four of the Code entitled "New Uniform
Payments Code" (NUPC).' °2 The changes proposed by this ten-
tative draft, produced under the auspices of the Permanent
Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code, include the
denial of holder in due course status to transferees of consumer
checks, and also may have this effect with respect to nonconsumer,
or business checks.' 03 The reasons for this change in existing law
should have a very familiar ring to persons familiar with the
prevailing arguments against consumer note negotiability:
Checks, like notes, have ceased to be widely negotiated, and are
no longer treated as cash substitutes .... [P]arties to whom
checks are negotiated rely principally on the credit of the person
from whom they take the check, rather than the drawer. This
'0 See Chemical Bank v. Haskell, 411 N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (N.Y. 1980); Jaeger &
Branch, Inc. v. Pappas, 433 P.2d 605, 607-08, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 950, 952 (Utah 1967).
202 A Federal Trade Commission Rule preempts the state law right to cut off defenses
in many cases. See 16 C.F.R. § 433.1-2 (1982). State statutes may provide supplemental
consumer protection. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 367.610 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
2I NEw Utm. PAYMErrs CODE (Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws,
Discussion Draft 1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 NUPC DRAFr]. This draft was submitted
at the August 1982 meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws for a first reading and then made available for public comment.
20, See id. at § 103. See generally Benfield, The New Payments Code and the Abolition
of Holder in Due Course Status as to Consumer Checks, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 11, 13-19
(1983).
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is particularly the case with checks drawn by consumers.... If
a bank takes a check from a payee, it is relying on that person's
credit if it allows withdrawal against uncollected funds, not the
credit standing of a drawer with whom it is unfamiliar ...
[Banks are] ... in a better position to appraise and to take the
risk of insolvency of the parties with which they deal ... ,4
Although the NUPC draft language abolishing holder in due
course may never become final, it does reflect dissatisfaction with
the current negotiability rules. If the provisions are included in a
final draft, they may be enacted into law.'05 Similar concern with
check negotiability may be found in judicial opinions applying
Code section 3-307 and summary judgment procedures to bank
claims of holder in due course standing. For example, in a case
discussed above the court found genuine issues as to a depositary
bank's good faith and lack of notice of defenses and refused to
allow the bank "to shift to [the drawer] ... its own probable loss
from the [payee's] ...machinations."'' 06 Thus, caution must be
exercised in asserting that the policies underlying negotiability re-
quire a determination that holder in due course status has been
established by a commercial paper claimant that is thereby entitled
to cut off defenses.
,04 1982 NUPC DA.Fr § 103 comment 1.
'"5 The final draft must be approved by the Uniform Commercial Code Permanent
Editorial Board, the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL), and the American Law Institute. Benfield, supra note 101, at 11 n.3. There
have already been some modifications to the 1982 NUPC language dealing with cutting
off defenses. See id. at 13 n.10.
Enactment could be at the state or federal level, and the NCCUSL is studying the
feasibility of a coordinated state and federal enactment. See 1982 NUPC DRAvr introduc-
tion at 37-40.
,' Seinfeld v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 405 So. 2d 1039, 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981). See also Northside Bank v. Investors Acceptance Corp., 278 F. Supp. 191 (W.D.
Pa. 1968); Arcanum Nat'l Bank v. Hessler, 433 N.E.2d 204, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 604
(Ohio 1982). See generally McDonnell, supra note 44, at 600-08.
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